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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jacob Ward appeals from the district court’s withheld judgment for battery on a law
enforcement officer. Mindful of State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506 (Ct. App. 2008), and State v.
Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370 (Ct. App. 1987), Mr. Ward argues the district court erred when it denied
his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Around 4:00 a.m. in June 2019,

Mr. Ward was riding his bike with a

friend near his home in a trailer park. (R., p.75.1) Deputy Anthony saw the two young men,
pulled into the trailer park, and turned on his overhead lights. (R., pp.75–76.) Mr. Ward turned
into a space between two trailers and put his hands in the air. (R., p.76.) Deputy Anthony got out
of his patrol car and told Mr. Ward kneel down and face one of the trailers. (R., p.76.) Mr. Ward
ran, and Deputy Anthony chased after him. (R., p.76.)
During that chase, [Deputy] Anthony drew his Taser, pushed [Mr. Ward] and
yelled threats and profanity.2 In addition to verbal threats, [Mr. Ward] was
pushed, punched in the face, and held to the ground with two officers on top of
him. He was hit approximately seven times in the ribs on his right side, ten times
on his left and drive stunned with a Taser twice.
(R., p.76.) Mr. Ward kicked Deputy Anthony twice during their altercation. (R., p.12 (probable
cause affidavit).) He also struck or scratched another officer’s arm when Deputy Anthony and
the other officer were on top of him. (R., p.12.) When Mr. Ward was pinned on the ground, he
repeatedly told the officers that he could not breathe and that he was “handicapped.” (R., p.18;

1

For purposes of the district court’s decision on Mr. Ward’s motion to suppress, the district court
adopted Mr. Ward’s recitation of the facts. (R., p.99.)
2
For example, Deputy Anthony told Mr. Ward: “‘I’m going to tase you, get on the fucking
ground’; ‘You dumb mother fucker’; ‘I’m going to fuck you up.’” (R., p.83.)
1

Tr., p.30, Ls.4–9.) Deputy Anthony told him “just shut up.” (R., p.83.) Once the officers
restrained Mr. Ward, Deputy Anthony told his supervisor that Mr. Ward might have to go to the
hospital because he “accidentally on purpose punched him in the face.” (R., p.84.)
The State filed a criminal complaint alleged Mr. Ward committed two counts of battery
on a law enforcement officer, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-903(a) and -915(3)(b). (R., pp.8–9.) The
magistrate judge ordered a mental health evaluation. (R., p.22.) The evaluator determined
Mr. Ward was not competent to assist in his defense or understand the proceedings. (Conf. Exs.,
pp.37–38.) The evaluator opined that Mr. Ward had a developmental disability. (Conf. Exs.,
p.37.) The evaluator noted that a recent assessment of Mr. Ward suggested his overall
functioning was equivalent to a six-year-old child. (Conf. Exs., p.37.)
The magistrate judge committed Mr. Ward to restore his competency. (R., pp.35–36.)
The judge terminated his commitment about three months later. (R., p.41.) After a preliminary
hearing, the magistrate judge bound Mr. Ward over to district court. (R., pp.43, 45.) The State
charged him by information with two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer. (R., pp.46–
47.)
Mr. Ward filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.67–69.) He argued that the officers did not
have reasonable suspicion to detain him and Deputy Anthony’s conduct violated his due process
rights. (R., pp.68–69.) The district court held a hearing, and Deputy Anthony testified. (R., p.73;
see generally Tr.) The district court reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript and admitted
photographs of the officers’ and Mr. Ward’s injuries, as well as the officers’ bodycam/dashcam
videos. (R., p.73; see also R., p.98.) The district court took the matter under advisement.
(R., p.73.)
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After the hearing, Mr. Ward filed a brief in support of his motion. He argued Deputy
Anthony did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him, as required by the Fourth Amendment.
(R., pp.76–82.) He also argued Deputy Anthony’s physical and verbal conduct was so
outrageous and offensive to amount to a due process violation. (R., pp.83–86.) Due to these
constitutional violations, he asserted:
Any evidence, conduct or testimony obtained as a result of the officer’s unlawful
behavior is tainted and should be suppressed according to the Exclusionary Rule.
For these reasons, . . . [Mr.] Ward respectfully requests this Court grant his
motion to suppress and bar the State from introducing any evidence obtained as a
result of his illegal seizure and the unlawful conduct of the police.
(R., p.86.) The State objected to Mr. Ward’s motion. (R., pp.88–96.)
The district court denied Mr. Ward’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.98–102.) The district
court accepted Mr. Ward’s version of the facts for purposes of deciding the motion. (R., p.99.)
The district court determined:
In support of his request to suppress the evidence of the alleged battery in this
case, the Defendant argues that his “contact with [Deputy Anthony] was an illegal
seizure and detention not supported at its inception by probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.” However, even taking the facts exactly as urged by the
Defendant, “one believing himself unlawfully arrested should submit to the
officer and thereafter seek his legal remedies in court.” Therefore, a private
citizen such as the Defendant “may not use force to resist peaceful arrest by one
he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized peace officer performing
his duties, regardless of whether the arrest is illegal in the circumstances of the
occasion.” That duty holds in this case no matter how imprudent it was for
Deputy Anthony to pursue the Defendant without any reasonable suspicion
whatsoever and regardless of whether or not there was a legal basis for the
Defendant’s arrest.
(R., pp.100–01 (footnotes and citations omitted) (bolded emphasis in original).) The district court
continued:
While a defendant is entitled to protect himself “if the officers initiated the
violence, or used excessive force,” that right would “simply afford a potential
defense” to a charge such as battery on a correctional officer and “would not be a
ground for excluding evidence relating to those charges.” Thus, a defendant has

3

“no underlying right to resist the officers’ attempt to make a peaceable arrest.”. . .
“[T]he exclusionary rule does not give the aggrieved individual free rein to
commit criminal acts against a law enforcement officer just because the officer
erred by conducting an unlawful search or seizure.” As such, regardless of
whether Deputy Anthony conducted an unconstitutional seizure of the Defendant
in this case, the subsequent attack by Ward on Deputy Anthony is a new crime,
and evidence of that alleged battery or other forceful resistance flowed not from
the illegal arrest, but from the Defendant’s own conduct. Such evidence is not
subject to the exclusionary rule.
(R., pp.101–02 (footnotes and citations omitted).) Therefore, the district denied the motion and
held all evidence of Mr. Ward’s alleged battery was admissible. (R., p.102.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Ward pled guilty to count one of battery on a law
enforcement officer. (R., pp.121–22.) Mr. Ward reserved the right to appeal the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.112.) The district court withheld judgment and placed
Mr. Ward on probation for two years. (R., pp.124, 125–28.) Mr. Ward timely appealed.
(R., pp.130–32.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ward’s motion to suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ward’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mindful of Lusby and Hartwig, Mr. Ward maintains the district court erred by denying

his motion to suppress. Mr. Ward asserts the district court should have suppressed any evidence
relating to the alleged battery due to Deputy Anthony’s violation of Mr. Ward’s Fourth
Amendment and due process rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court “defer[s] to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.

However, free review is exercised over a trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found.” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658
(2007) (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ward’s Motion To Suppress In Light Of
The Constitutional Violations During His Seizure
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003); see U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable, unless the State shows the
seizure fits within a well-established exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Green, 158
Idaho 884, 886–87 (2015).
“[L]imited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible
when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime.” State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Florida v.
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Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 499–500 (1983) (plurality opinion)). “Reasonable suspicion must be
based on specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those
facts.” State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013) (quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811
(2009)). “The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to
the officer at or before the time of” the seizure. Id.
In Lusby, the Court of Appeals held “an individual may not use force to resist a peaceable
arrest by one she knows or has good reason to believe is a police officer, even if the arrest is
illegal under the circumstances.” 146 Idaho at 509 (citing State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 451
(1973); State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 627 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174,
177–78 (Ct. App. 1988)). “Instead, an individual subjected to illegal arrest should later pursue
rights and remedies afforded by the civil or criminal law.” Id. (citing Richardson, 95 Idaho at
451). “[W]hen a suspect responds to an unconstitutional search or seizure by a physical attack on
the officer, evidence of this new crime is admissible notwithstanding the prior illegality.” Id. In
sum, the exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress evidence of the defendant’s alleged attack
on the officer. Id. at 509–10.
In contrast to a peaceable arrest, an individual may respond to violence by an officer;
however, the exclusionary rule still does not apply to the individual’s conduct in responding to
the officer’s attack. In Hartwig, the Court of Appeals held an individual may use force to protect
himself from officer-initiated violence or excessive force. 112 Idaho at 376. “A defendant has a
constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force by officers in the performance of their
duties. Furthermore, a defendant has a right to defend himself against the use of excessive force
by an officer.” Id. (citations omitted). These rights “afford a potential defense to the charges,”
but they are not “a ground for excluding evidence relating to those charges.” Wren, 115 Idaho at
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627. In other words, the exclusionary rule does not permit the suppression of evidence related to
a defendant’s charges in response to an officer’s use of excessive force. Hartwig, 112 Idaho at
376. “A determination of excessive force is a question of fact for the jury.” Id. (citation omitted).
Mindful of Lusby and Hartwig, Mr. Ward nonetheless argues the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress. First, he contends Deputy Anthony did not have reasonable
suspicion to seize him. (R., pp.78–79.) The totality of the circumstances known to Deputy
Anthony were that two young men were riding bikes early in the morning and turned around
once they reached the entrance of the trailer park. (R., pp.78–79.) This information did not
establish reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Ward committed or was about to commit a
crime. (See R., pp.76–82.) Second, Mr. Ward submits Deputy Anthony’s conduct—“yelling
expletives and threats” and striking him on both sides of his ribs, kneeling on him so he could
not breathe, punching him in the face and smashing it into the pavement, and stunning him twice
with a Taser—so “shocks the conscience” and offends “our sense of justice and fair play” to
violate due process. (R., pp.83–86.) See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (police’s
forced entry into defendant’s home and defendant’s transport to the hospital to have his stomach
pumped to obtain evidence against him “shocks the conscience” and violates due process of law,
which requires reversal of conviction). Due to either the Fourth Amendment or due process
violation, while mindful of Lusby and Hartwig, Mr. Ward maintains the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Ward respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate its withheld judgment, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of February, 2021.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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